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Abstract
This paper study the interplay between private and public health care in a Na-
tional Health Service. We consider a two-stage game, where at stage one a Health
Authority sets the public sector wage and a subsidy to (or tax on) private provision.
At stage two physicians decide how much to work in the public and the private
sector. We characterise diﬀerent equilibria depending on the Health Authority’s ob-
jectives, the physicians’ job preferences, and the cost eﬃciency of private relative
to public provision of health care. We ﬁnd that the scope for a mixed health care
system is limited when physicians are indiﬀerent between working in the public and
private sector. Competition between physicians triggers a shift from public provision
towards private provision, and an increase in the total amount of health care pro-
vided. The endogenous nature of labour supply may have counter-intuitive eﬀects.
For example, a cost reduction in the private sector is followed by a higher wage in
the public sector.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most health care systems involve a mixture of public and private provision. In a National
Health Service (NHS), though, the role for private health care is quite diﬀerent than in
private (or mixed) health care systems along several dimensions (Besley and Gouveia,
1994). In particular, health care is mainly provided publicly and ﬁnanced by general tax-
ation rather than private insurance payments. Still there exists a private sector alongside
the public one in most countries with a NHS. An important diﬀerence, though, is that
patients receive public health care for free, while seeking private health care they often
have to cover the costs of the medical treatment by themselves.
Another interesting feature of NHS systems is that a substantial share of the physi-
cians tends to work in both sectors. For example, in the UK most private medical services
are provided by physicians whose main commitment is to the NHS. The UK Monopolies
and Merger Commission (1994) estimated that about 61% of the NHS consultants had
signiﬁcant private work. Similar observations can be made in Norway, Sweden, France,
etc. In other words, there seems to be close links between the public and the private
sector not only on the demand side but also on the supply side.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the complex relationship between the public
and the private sector in a National Health Service, emphasising the direct links between
the two sectors. The analysis will focus on the following questions: How does the option
for NHS physicians to provide private health care aﬀect the public provision? In what
way may physicians’ job preferences matter? Could it be that such a system is potentially
unstable because the private sector tends to drive out the public sector? How should
the Health Authority set wages in the public sector, and should it tax or subsidise the
private sector?
To analyse these questions, we consider a situation where there is a Health Authority
(e.g. the Ministry of Health) that sets a public sector wage and a subsidy to (or tax on)
private provision of health care. Based on the payments in the public and the private
sector, and on their job preferences, physicians decide how much to work in either sector.
2In the public sector physicians are on salary, while in the private sector they are self-
e m p l o y e da n de a r np r o ﬁts from their private practice. Irrespective of the payments,
physicians may have some intrinsic preferences for working in a public hospital or at
a private clinic, which may be related to non-pecuniary job characteristics in the two
sectors (see e.g. Scott, 2001).
The physicians labour supply is decisive of the amount of public versus private health
care that will be provided. Patients perceive public and private health care as, but prefers
to taken care of by the public sector since this is free at the point of consumption. Patients
not served by the public health care sector may instead demand private health care.
The Health Authority may inﬂuence the physicians labour supply via the public
sector wage oﬀered and possible support on the private sector. While a higher wage will
encourage physicians to spend more time in a public hospital, a subsidy on the private
health care provision will have the opposite eﬀect. However, it also has the opportunity
to tax the private sector to induce more public provision. We investigate in detail how the
Health Authority’s wage setting and support (or taxation) of private sector is inﬂuenced
by physicians’ endogenous supply of labour, the costs of providing private health care as
well as the costs associated with distortionary taxation.
There are some obvious informational asymmetries in the health care market. A large
part of the literature is therefore concerned with the implications of such informational
asymmetries for the amount of health care and the quality of it.1 For example, several
studies raise the issue of how the reimbursement scheme aﬀects the total supply of health
care as well as the quality.2 In this paper, though, we sidestep from some of the issues
that have been investigated in detail in the literature. We apply a model that does
not encompass private information, and we do not raise the issue how quality of care
1See Frech (1996) for a discussion of issues in the health market in general, and Frech (1991) for a
discussion of compensation schemes for physicians.
2Ellis and McGuire (1986, 1990) have considered how the reimbursement scheme aﬀects the supply
of health services, while Ma (1994) and Sharma (1998) have investigated how it aﬀects quality as well as
the incentives for reducing costs. For a survey of the literature, see Newhouse (1996) or Ennis (1998).
3is aﬀected by the structure of the health sector. This allows us to concentrate on the
complex relationship between a public and a private health care market, where there are
direct links between those two sectors on both the supply and the demand side.
In the literature there are few studies that examine the mix of private and public
health care. One study that does, and is closely related to ours, is Rickman and McGuire
(1999).3 Their modelling approach is distinctly diﬀerent from ours in many respects,
though. First, we let a physician’s utility be determined by his/her total wage income
in the public sector as well as his/her income from the private sector. In contrast, in
Rickman and McGuire (1999) a physician’s utility from public sector work is determined
by the performance of his/her public hospital as well as from his patients’ satisfaction.
Second, we assume an increasing marginal disutility of work. The reason for this is
that each physician may face a soft time constraint, ﬁnding it more and more costly to
supply an extra hour of labour. In contrast, Rickman and McGuire (1999) assume a
constant marginal disutility. In their setting, therefore, there are no direct links on the
cost side between the two sectors. Third, we let the government act as a monopsonist
in the labour market in the public health sector and the hospital then receives full-cost
reimbursement. Although Rickman and McGuire (1999) have full-cost reimbursement in
the public sector, they have no direct link between the costs associated with public health
care and the physicians’ revenue from such an activity. Finally, we assume strategic
interaction between physicians, while Rickman and McGuire (1999), building on the
model of Ellis and McGuire (1986), ignores the role of competition.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss various modelling issues,
3There are other studies of the interplay between public and private health care. Barros and Martinez-
Giralt (2000) analyse the rivalry between preferred providers and out-of-plan providers under diﬀerent
reimbursement rules. Jofre-Bonet (2000) deals with the interaction between public and private providers
when consumers diﬀer in their income levels. Marchand and Schroyen (2000) consider how diﬀerent
physician contracts aﬀect the mixture of public and private health care. They use a setting with mo-
nopolistic competition between physicians and where the government takes distributional aspects into
account.
4such as the formulation of demand and supply and the nature of the rivalry between the
physicians. In Section 3 we derive the physicians labour supply for given payments. In
Section 4, we report results concerning the equilibrium outcomes in two separate cases.
In the ﬁrst one, the role of physicians’ job preferences is analysed, while in the second
case, we consider asymmetric (cost) eﬃciencies in providing care. Finally, in Section 5,
we summarise our ﬁndings.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider a health care system characterised by a National Health Service (NHS). In this
system there is three types of agents; The Health Authority (e.g. Ministry of Health), the
hospital-based physicians, and individuals in need for medical treatment (i.e. patients).
The health authority is responsible for providing public health care, assumed to be free
of charge for the patients at the point of consumption. Physicians decide to work in a
public hospital and/or establish their own private practise. Since private health care is
not included in the NHS, patients are charged a (full-cost) price if they decide to visit
a private practice. The demand for private health care is represented by the following
inverse demand function:
p =1− QO − QP, (1)
where p is the marginal willingness to pay, Qo is the quantity of health care provided
by the public sector (o) and Qp is the quantity of health care provided by the private
sector (p). First, note from (1) that public and private health care are assumed to be
perfect substitutes from the patients’ perspective.4 Second, note that we assume eﬃcient
rationing. As the public sector provision of health care increases, the marginal willingness
4McAvinchey and Yannopoulos (1994) ﬁnd in an empirical study that private and public health care
are substitutes. In some cases one could argue that private health care is of higher quality than public
health care, and in other cases vice versa. Since we consider a situation where physicians operate in
both the private and the public sector, we ﬁnd it reasonable to assume public and private health care as
perfect substitutes.
5to pay for private health care drops. Hence, the public sector has by assumption served
those consumers with the highest willingness to pay for health care.56
On the supply side, the important input to production is health personnel. Let us
call them physicians. For ease of exposition, let us normalise input and output so that
one unit of labour equals one unit of health care. Then Qi denotes the units of labour
used in sector i,w h e r ei = o,p. Since we focus on a speciﬁc health care product, it is
plausible to assume that there is only a limited number of physicians qualiﬁed to supply
t h eh e a l t hc a r ep r o d u c ti nq u e s t i o ni nas p e c i ﬁc area. In line with this, we simplify by
assuming that there are only two physicians in the market, which may work in both the
public and the private sector. Let qk
i denote the labour supplied by physician k in sector




In the public sector, the physicians are on salary, earning the wage, w per unit of
labour. In the private sector physicians are self-employed and earns the proﬁtf r o mt h e i r
private practice. Private sector revenues are equal to the price p, and possibly a transfer
r from the health authority, per unit of health care (and thereby per unit of labour)
provided.
Spending time providing health care generates disutility for the physicians. We ﬁnd
it plausible to assume a convex disutility function: the longer a physician initially works,
5Although we have not explicitly modeled waiting cost, one may argue that it is included in an implicit
manner. If there is excess demand at a price for public health care equal to zero, the waiting line consists
of those neither served by public nor private health care providers. However, the deadweight loss we
derive from the demand function would capture the loss associated with not being served. See Iversen
(1997) for an explicit modeling of waiting costs.
6This formulation is chosen since it is consistent with a system where public health sector’s priority
depends on the seriousness of the disease. However, high willingness to pay may not only depend on the
serverity of the disease, but may also depend on the wealth at an individual’s disposal. It is diﬃcult to
disentangle these two eﬀects, so distributional concerns may point in another direction. This might be
of large importance if the income distribution is very skewed. Since we are focusing only on eﬃciency,
we should be cautious with the interpretation of our model in a situation where the income distribution
is very skewed.
6the greater disutility from a marginal labour increase.7 In line with this, we let the
marginal disutility be inﬂuenced by a physician’s total amount of labour in public and
private sector.
However, it seems plausible as well to assume that a decision to work more in one
of the sectors is inﬂuenced not only by total labour input, but also by how much she
works in that particular sector initially. The more a person has worked in one sector, the
higher marginal disutility in this particular sector. This reﬂects that physicians are not
indiﬀerent about where to work. In particular, they may have an intrinsic preference for
working in both the public and the private sector.8 A disutility function that encompasses














where 0 < δ < 2. The parameter δ measures the degree of substitutability between
working in the public and the private sector for each physician.9 If δ → 2,t h em a r g i n a l
disutility is determined by only the total amount of labour supplied. This corresponds
to the case where physician k perceives working in a public hospital or at a private
clinic as perfect substitutes. Contrary, if δ → 0, the marginal disutility is determined by
only how much the physician works in either private or public sector initially, implying
that the allocation of labour supply between the two sectors matters. This refers to the
7In our setting we consider physicians that work in both the public and private sector. The total
amount of work can then be quite high, and each physician may face some restrictions on their labour
supply: There are obviously physical limitations to how much each of them can work each day. Then it
is natural to assume that each physician’s total supply is approaching some kind of capacity constraint,
and a convex disutility function captures such a case.
8This may be due to non-pecuniary factors like job characteristics. For instance, physicians may prefer
to work in the public sector because of opportunities for research and specialising, meeting colleagues,
access to medical facilities, etc. On the other hand, the private health care sector may be attractive
because of, for instance, more autonomy due to being self-employed. See e.g. Scott (2001) for the
relevance of this.
9Alternatively, we can think of δ as the fraction of physicians that are indiﬀerent between working in
the public and the private sector.
7case where physicians perceives public and private provision as imperfect substitutes,
for instance, due to some intrinsic preferences related to certain job characteristics, as
mentioned above.
We now have the following utility function for physician k:10
πk = wqk
o +( p + r − c)qk
p − Gk, (3)
where c denotes the marginal cost of providing health care in the private sector. The
total marginal cost in private health care is the sum of c and the marginal disutility.
With a slight abuse of terminology, in the following we refer to c as the marginal cost of
private health care.
A Health Authority (HA) is responsible for providing public health care. In line with
this, we ﬁnd it reasonable to assume that the HA has a monopsony role in the labour
market for health care workers. In particular, we assume that the HA sets the wage in the
public sector. In our model, we take this into account by allowing the health authority
to set w, the wage in the public sector. In addition, it can choose either to pay a per
unit subsidy (r>0) or impose a per unit tax (r<0) on private health care. The health
authority is in principle concerned about consumer surplus, physician utility as well as
any possible distortion in the economy generated by taxes. From (1) we can derive the
following utility function for persons demanding this particular health care product:





Public health care is by assumption provided at a price equal to zero for the patients.
Then the cost of public health care, as well as any possible payments to the private
10Note that we assume that physicians are not taking into account any patient beneﬁtf r o mh e a l t h
care when they maximize their utility. This non-altruistic approach is in contrast to some of the received
literature, for example Rickman and McGuire (1999), where the patient’s beneﬁt enters the physician’s
utility function in a direct way. In principle, though, it should be simple to encompass altruism in our
model. For example, it could be added as a downward shift in the disutility function.
8sector, is ﬁnanced by distortionary taxes. The social welfare function is the following:
W = U − pQp + β
2 X
k=1
πk − (1 + λ)(wQo + rQp), (5)
where β =0 ,1 and λ ∈ (0,1). The parameter λ represents the marginal cost of public
funds and captures the tax distortion. The other parameter β reﬂects the view that a
health authority may put a diﬀerent, and often lower, weight on provider surplus relative
to the patients’ beneﬁt of receiving health care.
Each physician determines her own labour supply in each sector. It is an open
question whether the physicians coordinate their decisions or not. For example, could
it be that the physicians coordinate their decisions in the private sector by establishing
a joint private health care ﬁrm where both works? In theory, there are four possible
situations. These are shown in Table 1 below.
In the situation called competition in Table 1, both physicians set their labour supply
non-cooperatively. That would be the case where physician k maximises the utility
function speciﬁed in (3), πk, with respect to qk
o and qk
p. However, we know from theory
that the players can jointly be better oﬀ in a collusive outcome. In such a case, the
physicians would maximise joint utility, π1 + π2, with respect to the physicians’ labour




p. In this situation, denoted perfect coordination
in Table 1, both physicians are expected to restrict their total supply of labour, thereby
increasing the equilibrium price in the private sector. If each physician’s discount factor
is suﬃciently high, we know that perfect coordination can be the equilibrium outcome in
a repeated game.





Sector No Private Competition
coordination
In the two remaining situations, public coordination and private coordination, the
physicians coordinate their labour supply in only one sector. However, we ﬁnd neither of
those two situations plausible. If the physicians have coordinated their labour supply in
one sector, why should they not extend the cooperation to also include the other sector
and thereby be better oﬀ?T h e r e f o r e , w e ﬁnd it reasonable to contrast competition
with perfect coordination. From now on we denote the latter simply coordination.W e
let superscript S and F denote coordination and competition, respectively. Whether
coordination would be the equilibrium outcome is determined by exogenous factors such
as period length and time preference rate. In addition, we may expect the structure
of the private sector to be of importance. In particular, whether antitrust enforcement
allows physicians to establish joint facilities can be decisive for whether a competitive
outcome is attained or not in the labour market.
T h er u l e so ft h eg a m ea r et h ef o l l o w i n g :
Stage 1: The government sets w and r.
Stage 2: The physicians set qk
i ,w h e r ei = o,p and k =1 ,2.
The model is solved by backward induction.
103 Physicians’ labour supply
Let us start the analysis by solving the game at stage two. In the competition game,
physician k sets qk
o and qk



















p = c +2 qk
p + δqk
o, (7)
where k,l =1 ,2 and k 6= l. The left-hand side of (6) and (7) represent the marginal
revenues of providing public and private health care, respectively, while the right-hand
sides are the corresponding marginal costs.
Notice the crowding-out eﬀect the physician is facing when deciding her labour supply
in the public and the private sector. When increasing the time spent at a public hospital,
more patients are taken care of in the public sector, and this will, in turn, lower the
demand for private health care. Thus, by restricting the labour supply in the public
sector, the physician increases the proﬁtability of working in the private sector. Solving
stage 2 of the game, yields the following equilibrium outcomes:
qF
o (w,r)=
5w − (1 + r − c)(1+δ)
8 − 3δ − δ2 (8)
qF
p (w,r)=
2(1+r − c) − w(2 + δ)
8 − 3δ − δ2 , (9)
where the superscript F denotes that we consider the competition game.




p to maximise joint proﬁt,



































11Second order conditions require that δ < −1+2
√
2 ' 1.83.
12Second order conditions require δ < −2+2
√
3 ' 1.46.
11Again the left-hand side of (10) and (11) are the marginal revenues of providing public and
private health care, respectively, and the right-hand sides are the corresponding marginal
costs. While coordination eliminates the negative externality between physicians due
to non-cooperatively labour supply present in the competition game, we see from the
conditions that the crowding-out eﬀect between public and private labour supply is also
present in this case. Solving the ﬁrst order conditions, yield the following outcomes at
stage 2 of the game:
qS
o (w,r)=
6w − (1 + r − c)(2+δ)
8 − 4δ − δ2 (12)
qS
p (w,r)=
2(1+r − c) − w(2 + δ)
8 − 4δ − δ2 , (13)
where the superscript S denotes that we consider the coordination game.
As expected, physicians will work more in the public sector and less in the private
sector when the wage (w) becomes higher, all else equal. The opposite is true when the
Health Authority subsidise private health care provision (r>0). We also see that the
marginal cost of private provision (c) aﬀects the physicians’ allocation of working time.
This is not true for any production costs in the public sector since these are covered by
the Health Authority and do not enter the physicians’ utility functions. Obviously, these
eﬀects are present irrespective of whether physicians compete or coordinate their labour
supply.
The eﬀect of physician preferences, measured by δ, on private versus public labour
supply (for given w and r) is, however, more complicated. Examination of the equilibrium
outcomes enables the following statement.





p > 0 if w ≤ wj
(ii) q
j
o > 0 and q
j
p =0if w ≥ wj





Proof. Consider the competition game (j = F). Setting (8) and (9) equal to zero









(1 + r − c),
where
wF − wF =
¡
8 − 3δ − δ2¢
5(2+δ)







14 + 4δ + δ2
5(2+δ)
2 (1 + r − c) < 0
In a similar way the results for the coordination game (j = S) can be proved.
When physicians have the ability to decide their labour supply in the public and
the private sector, and this aﬀects the number of patients treated in either sector, the
amount of public and private health care provided depends crucially on the public sector
wage relative to potential proﬁts in the private sector. From the Lemma its clear that
there is an upper and a lower bound on the wage that induce the physicians to work in
both sectors. If the wage becomes suﬃciently low, physicians decide to spend time only
in the private sector, while if the wage becomes suﬃciently high they decide to only work
in the public sector.
Less evident, though, is the eﬀect of physicians’ job preferences (measured by δ)o n
private versus public provision of health care. From the Lemma we see that as physicians
become more indiﬀerent about where to work, the scope for a mixed health care system
is reduced. The reason for this is two-fold: First, δ aﬀects the total amount of labour
physicians are willing to supply. When δ becomes higher, the cost of working an extra
hour in either sector is increasing, and this tends to lower physicians’ total labour supply
for a given payment. Second, δ also aﬀects the physicians’ division of labour between
the two sectors. When physicians have an intrinsic motivation for working in a public
hospital or at a private clinic (δ → 0), this provides an incentive for the physicians to
split their working time, irrespective of relative payments in the two sectors. On the
13other hand, when physicians are indiﬀerent between where to work (δ → 2), they tend
to spend all their working hours in the sector which yields the higher payment.
4 The Health Authority
Having described the physicians incentives to work in the public and the private sector for
given payments (w and r), we now turn to the HA’s decision about the public sector wage
and support to (or taxation of) private health care provision. We assume that the HA is
either concerned about patients’ welfare only, or both patients’ and physicians’ welfare.
Two separate cases are analysed. In the ﬁrst one, attention is restricted to physicians’
job preferences and how this may inﬂuence the HA’s wage setting and support to the
private sector, and, in turn, the scope for public and private health care. In the second
one, we will focus on asymmetric (cost) eﬃciency of providing health care, and examine
how this may aﬀect the desirability of public versus private health care. In either case, we
also analyse how the nature of competition between physicians may alter HA’s decisions.
4.1 Physicians’ job preferences
Let us start by examining the role of physicians’ job preferences. For simplicity, we
assume that public and private provision are equally eﬃcient, i.e. c =0 .C o n s i d e raH A
that only cares about patients’ welfare (β =0 ) . From (5), the HA solves the following
problem
max
w,r U − pQp − (1 + λ)(wQo + rQp),
anticipating the physicians’ labour supply responses, which in the competition case is
given by (8) and (9), and in the coordination case is given by (12) and (13). Note
that when the HA does not care about providers’ surplus, physicians’ job preferences
do not directly aﬀect the HA’s decisions, but only indirectly via the physicians’ labour
supply responses to diﬀerent wages and subsidies. The equilibrium outcomes in both the
competition and coordination game are presented in Table A in the Appendix.
14Let us start by investigating how physicians’ job preferences aﬀects the scope for
public and private provision of health care. From the equilibrium outcomes, we can
establish the following result.
Proposition 2 Assume that c =0and β =0 ,a n dl e tj = S,F.
(i) q
j
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in Table A in the Appendix, equal to zero and solve the expressions for δ,w h e r ej = F,S.
We then get the following critical values for public provision
δF
o (λ)=
−3λ2 +4 λ +5
2(λ2 +2 λ +1 )
and δS
o (λ) ≡
−2λ2 +2 λ +3
2λ + λ2 +1
and for private provision
δF




p (λ) ≡ 2λ +1 ,
in the competition case (F) and the coordination case (S), respectively.
Thus, the scope for public and private provision of health care depends crucially on
physicians’ job preferences (δ). Both public and private provision of health care requires
that physicians’ perceive working in the public and private sector as suﬃciently imperfect
substitutes (i.e. δ is suﬃciently low). However, the relation to the marginal cost of public
funds are diﬀerent. While a high λ tends to reduce the scope for public provision of health
care, the opposite is true for a low λ. The reason is, of course, that public provision is
purely based on costly transfers from the Health Authority, while private provision is
only partially so, given that (r>0).
In Figure 1, we have characterised the diﬀerent regimes that may emerge depending
on physicians’ job preferences (δ) and the marginal cost of public funds (λ) for the
competition game. A similar picture is present for the coordination game. In this ﬁgure,
15Figure 1: The scope for a mixed health care system when j = F,c =0 .
Regime A refers to a mixed health care system including both public and private health
care provision, while Regime B refers to a purely private regime without any public
provision, and Regime C refers to a purely public regime.
To fully understand the mechanisms at work let us consider how the public sector
wage and the subsidy to the private sector are inﬂuenced by the physicians’ job prefer-
ences. From the equilibrium outcomes in Table A in the Appendix, the following result
can be established.
Proposition 3 Assume that c =0and β =0 .
(i) rj < 0, where j = F,S.
(ii) wS >w F if δ < δw (λ),a n drS <r F if δ < δr (λ)
Proof. (i) By setting rF and rS (in Table A in the Appendix) equal to zero and
then solve for δ we get:
δF
r =
−3 − 8λ − 4λ2 +
p
(49 + 200λ +3 0 4 λ2 + 200λ3 +4 8 λ4)




−3 − 10λ − 5λ2 +
p
(121 + 532λ + 874λ2 + 620λ3 + 161λ4)
2(2λ2 +4 λ +2 )
.














(see footnote 13), which are the relevant values of δ in the competition game and the
coordination game, respectively.
(ii) By setting wS = wF and rS = rF, respectively, and solving for δ,w eg e tt h e






for given values of λ.
Thus, irrespective of whether physicians compete or coordinate their labour supply,
the HA imposes a tax on their provision of private health care. To understand this
result, remember the HA’s objectives, which is to maximise patients’ utility while take
into account distortions due to costly public transfers. Although patients consider public
and private health care as perfect subsitutes, the fact that they have to pay the full bill
in the private sector implies that they prefer to be taken care of by a public hospital,
which tends to limit the scope for a private sector.
On the other hand, free public health care means that public provision relies fully
on costly transfers from the HA, which tends to limit the scope for the public sector. In
addition, the HA must take into account the physicians’ labour market responses. This
is especially the case when physicians are rather indiﬀerent about where to work (a high
δ). In this situation, they tend to spend all their time in the sector which yields the
higher revenue, and this, together with the ﬁscal argument above, explains why the HA
chooses to impose a tax on private health care provision.
The comparison of the coordination and the competition case (part (ii) of the Propo-
sition) is illustrated in Figure 2. We see that as long as physicians are suﬃciently inter-
ested in working in both sectors (δ is suﬃciently low), they will face a higher wage in
the public sector, but also a higher tax in the private sector, when they coordinate their
labour supply rather than compete. This refers to regime A in the ﬁgure. The reason
is intuitive. Coordination of labour supply has two eﬀects. First, it tends to restrict
the total amount of time spent in providing care. Second, it tends to increase the proﬁt
potential in the private sector. To secure an optimal level of public health care the HA,
17Figure 2: Comparison of wages and subsidies in the competition and coordination game
for c =0 ,β =0 .
therefore, must set a higher wage and a higher tax on private provision to induce the
physicians to reallocate their labour supply.
On the other hand, if physicians become suﬃciently indiﬀerent between where to
work two things may happen. First, if the marginal cost of public funds (λ) is high,
this limits the HA’s ability to set high wages to attract physicians to the public sector.
However, this makes it more tractable for the HA to tax physicians in order to reduce
the proﬁtability of working in the private sector, which explains why wS <w F (and
rS <r F) is true in this situation. In regime C, where the marginal cost of public funds
is low, the opposite is true, implying that rS >r F (and wS >w F).T h i sd e m o n s t r a t e s
that taxation may work as a regulatory substitute for public sector wage in provision of
health care.
4.2 Asymmetric cost eﬃciency
The results above where derived under the assumption that the public and the private
sector were equally (cost) eﬃcient in producing health care. In practice, this may not
always be the case. In health care systems characterised as NHS, public hospitals may
18have access to inputs, like medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, etc., at lower prices
than private clinics, for instance, because they are larger buyers. In this section we will
therefore assume a positive marginal cost in the private sector (c>0), while the marginal
cost in the public sector is normalised to zero.13 To focus on the eﬀect of asymmetric
cost, we will abstract from the issue of physicians’ job preferences. For simplicity, we
assume that δ =1 , which means that the public and private sector is considered as
imperfect substitutes by the physicians. Moreover, we restrict attention to a HA that is
concerned about both patients’ and physicians’ welfare (β =1 ) .T h i si sn o tc r u c i a lf o r
the analysis as the results are not qualitatively altered for the other case.
From (5), the HA solves the following problem:
max
w,r W = U − pQp +
X
k πk − (1 + λ)(wQo + rQp),
anticipating the physicians’ labour supply responses, which are given by (8) and (9) for
the competition game and (12) and (13) for the coordination game. The equilibrium
outcomes in are shown in Table C in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 Assume that δ =1 . Then
(i) q
j
o > 0 and q
j
p > 0 if c ∈
¡
cj,cj¢
,w h e r ej = F,S.
(ii) cF > cS,a n dcF >c S.
(iii) ∂cj
∂λ > 0,a n d
∂cj
∂λ > 0,w h e r ej = F,S.
Proof. cS (or cS) is found by setting the equilibrium value of qS
p (or qS
o )i nt h e
coordination regime (see Table C) equal to zero and solve with respect to c, yielding the
following critical values
cS ≡
1+2 λ +4 λ2
4(1+2λ + λ2)
and cS ≡
−1 − 3λ +6 λ2
3(1+3λ +2 λ2)
In a similar way, we ﬁnd
cF ≡
1+3 λ +4 λ2
4(1+2λ + λ2)
and cF ≡
−1 − 3λ +6 λ2
3(1+3λ +2 λ2)
,
13One can interprete a negative c as the private sector being more eﬃcient than the public sector in
providing health care. However, this must be considered as an approximation.
19in the competition game. It is easy to check that cj >c j,w h e r ej = F,S.F r o mt h e s e
expressions, we have that
cF − cS =
λ
4(1+λ)
2 > 0 and cF − cS =
2λ
9+4 2 λ +6 3 λ2 +3 0 λ3 > 0

























1+2 0 λ +2 5 λ2¢
(1 + λ)
2 (3 + 5λ)
2 > 0.
The proposition shows that there is no interior solution if marginal costs in the private
sector are either too high or too low. When c is suﬃciently low only private provision
of health care is an equilibrium, while the opposite is true when c is suﬃciently high.
The reason is intuitive. Consider the case of a low c. On one hand, a low c makes
private provision less undesirable since it is both more eﬃcient and yields lower prices,
which both tend to increase the scope for private provision. On the other hand, a low
c induces the physicians to work more in the private sector because they earn higher
proﬁts relative to the case of a high c.T h u s , w h e n c is low the HA must oﬀer a high
wage (or impose a substantial tax) to mitigate physicians’ incentives to reallocate their
labour supply towards the private sector.
Moreover, we see from (iv) that an increase in the marginal cost of public funds (λ)
will reduce the scope for the public sector. The reason is obvious. By allowing the private
sector to provide relatively more health care, and not subsidising private health care (see
below), the HA can avoid serious distortions caused by taxation.
20Public and private health care when δ =1and β =1 .
In Figure 3, we have shown the upper and lower bounds on c depending on the
marginal cost of public fund in both the competition and the coordination case. From
the ﬁgure (and result (ii) in the Proposition) we see that the critical values of c are higher
when physicians compete rather than coordinate their labour supply, which means that
there is less scope for public provision in this case. To understand this, note the trade-oﬀ
the HA is facing. On one hand, free health care by the public sector typically leads to a
smaller price distortion than what is the case with private health care. This is the case if
the price-cost margin in the private sector is larger than the (negative) price-cost margin
in the public sector. If so, public health care leads to a lower deadweight loss.
On the other hand, free public health care incur costs associated with distortionary
taxation, a cost that is not present in a private sector. The higher the wage paid to
physicians, and thereby the larger capacity in the public sector, the higher is the cost
associated with distortionary taxation. If physicians compete, labour supply in the
private sector will increase and the deadweight loss will be reduced. Thus, it is no surprise
then that competition between physicians results in a greater scope for the private sector
to provide health care. This result suggests that an increase in the number of physicians
would lead to a greater scope for the private provision of health care. The intuition
is that a larger number of physicians would result in a lower price-cost margin in the
private sector, and therefore less concern for deadweight loss in the private sector.
21Proposition 5 Assume that δ =1and c ∈
¡
cj,cj¢
,w h e r ej = F,S.
(i) ∂wS
∂c < 0,a n d∂wF
∂c < 0 if λ < 1.
(ii) ∂rS
∂c < (≥)0if λ < (≥)
√
241−7
12 ' 0.71,a n d∂rF
∂c > 0.
Proof. F r o mt h ee q u i l i b r i u mv a l u e sr e p o r t e di nT a b l eX ,w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n ge ﬀects


















−8+7 λ +6 λ2




3+8 λ +5 λ2
(5 + 7λ)(1+3λ)
.
Then we can easily verify the results reported in the Proposition.
Intuitively, we would expect the HA to respond to a cost reduction in the private
sector by lowering the public sector wage and increasing the support to the private sector.
From the Proposition we see that this is true for the wage setting, while the picture is
more complicated when it comes to the subsidy (or tax) of private health care provision.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case where physicians coordinate labour supply. In this case,
the HA increases the subsidy as a response to lower private sector costs, as we would a
priori expect. However, this is only true as long as the tax distortions are suﬃciently
small. The reason for this is as follows. A lower c makes private provision more proﬁtable,
inducing the physicians to work more in the private sector, for a given payment. This
means that the public transfers to the private sector increases, but they increase more
when λ is high than if it is low, which explains why the HA responds by lowering the
subsidy in this case.
In the competition case, the HA’s response to a change in marginal costs in the
private sector is distinctly diﬀerent from the coordination regime. In particular, the HA
responds by reducing its support to the private sector irrespective of the size of the tax
distortions. The intuition is that a private sector cost reduction triggers more intense
rivalry between the physicians, which leads to an increase the labour supply in the private
22sector that is higher than in coordination regime. Then the HA does not need to trigger
any further increase in the activity level by increasing the support to the private sector.
In fact, the HA lowers its support to the private sector and increases the wage to dampen
the reduction in activity in the public sector.
Proposition 6 Assume that δ =1and c ∈
¡
cj,cj¢
,w h e r ej = F,S.
(i) rS > 0 if c<−2+7λ+6λ2
−8+7λ+6λ2,a n drF > 0 if c<−1−2λ+5λ2
3+8λ+5λ2 .
(ii) wS >w F if c< 7+32λ+73λ2+116λ3+24λ4
2(14+71λ−118λ2+73λ3+12λ4).
(iii) rS >r F if c< 7+10λ+4λ2+79λ3+30λ4
28+117λ−198λ2+139λ3+30λ4.
Proof. Setting rS and rF (reported in Table C) equal to zero, respectively, and then
solve the expressions with respect to c, yields result (i). Result (ii) is found by setting
wS = wF,a n dt h e ns o l v ef o rc.T h e nw eh a v et h ec r i t i c a lv a l u es h o w no nt h er i g h t - h a n d
side of (ii), from now on labelled b c.I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
∂(wS−wF)
∂c < 0, which implies
that wS >w F for any c<b c. Furthermore, it can be shown that b c<cS if λ < 1.I na
similar way, we can prove (iii).
From the Proposition we see that the HA subsidises (taxes) private health care if the
marginal cost of private provision (c) is suﬃciently low (high). The reason is that the
HA is concerned about the total surplus in society, and encourages private health care
only if it is suﬃciently cost eﬃcient relative to public provision. Since public support is
raised through distortionary taxation, the decision of whether to subsidise (or tax) the
private sector depends also on the size of the loss due to tax collection.
We see from parts (ii) and (iii) in the proposition that coordination between physi-
cians involves a higher wage and a higher subsidy (or lower tax) than if they compete,
given that the marginal cost of private provision is suﬃciently low. The intuition is that
labour supply is lower when the physicians coordinate their activities, inducing the HA
to encourage them to work more in both sectors by raising the wage and the support to
the private sector. However, for suﬃciently high costs in the private sector this result
may be reversed, and both wages and support for the private sector may be lower in
the coordination regime than in the competitive regime. The reason is, as explained
23above, that a cost increase has a distinctly diﬀerent eﬀect on the labour supply in the
two regimes. It dampens the rivalry between the physicians in the competitive regime,
and the HA responds by increasing its support to the private sector. In the coordination
regime, on the other hand, the HA responds by reducing its support to the private sector,
or increasing support by a lower amount than in the competitive regime. This has, in
turn, implications for the wage setting.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The purpose of this article has been to investigate public policy in mixed health care
systems with close links between the private and the public health care sector on both
the demand and the supply side. Although the model is stylised, many of our results
are ambiguous. For example, (i) the public health care sector can either be driven out
of the market or not, and (ii) private health care can be either taxed or subsidized.
A m b i g u i t yi nas t y l i s e dm o d e li m p l i e st h a tw ewill also have to report ambiguous results
in a generalized version of our model. This fact suggests that the model should not be
used to predict some clear-cut results or to make clear-cut policy recommendations, but
rather to point out some mechanisms that may be of importance in mixed health care
systems.
First, we have pointed to a fundamental problem that may arise when physicians are
allowed to earn revenues from private health care in addition to wage income from public
health care. Physicians can increase the demand for private health care by restricting
their supply of labour in the public health sector. The outcome in terms of health care
system depends crucially on the physicians job preferences. When physicians are close to
being indiﬀerent between work in the public and private sectors, the scope for a mixed
health care system tends to be very limited.
Second, the endogenous nature of labour supply complicates public policy. In some
cases results are in line with what we expect. For example, the HA supports the private
sector if the cost of private health care is suﬃciently low. In other cases, though, it is not
24that straightforward. For example, consider the case of a more eﬃcient private sector.
This triggers a shift of labour supply from public to private health care. Then it is not
obvious whether the government should respond by increasing or reducing the wage in
the public sector. The latter may apparently be the right choice. But we ﬁnd in our
setting that in some cases it should respond to a cost reduction in the private sector by
increasing the public wage, thereby dampening the shift of labour supply from the public
to the private sector.
Third, we show that the nature of the rivalry between the physicians may be im-
portant for public policy. In our setting, physicians can either coordinate their labour
supply or compete on labour supply. Unsurprisingly, we ﬁnd that competition between
physicians results in an increase in private health care production and a reduction in
public health care production. In our model the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, so that competi-
tion between physicians leads to an increase in total production in the health sector. Less
obvious, though, is the eﬀect of a cost reduction in the private sector. When physicians
compete, this triggers more intense rivalry between them. Then the government may
ﬁnd it optimal to reduce support to the private health care sector in order to dampen
the shift in labour supply from the public to the private sector. In the case of high costs
in the private sector we ﬁnd in our setting that both the public wage and the support
to (taxation of) the private sector is higher (lower) if physicians compete than if they
coordinate their labour supply.
256 Appendix
Table A: Equilibrium outcomes when c =0and β =0 .
























26Table B: Equilibrium outcomes when δ =1and β =1 .
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